How do you make a bullet proof car? Today we are going to find out. Armor Max invited Dan and I to come shoot some of their armored vehicles, and the results re pretty amazing! Check them out here: https://www.armormax.com/
This is not a sponsored video. Its just super interesting to see how all of this technology works, and how Bullet proof cars are manufactured. There are several parts to a bullet proof car. The ballistic glass is pretty important. Its a layered slab of glass and plastic that stops the forward energy of the bullet.
Inside the metal paneling of your car are other bullet proof slabs. Some companies use heavy steel to block bullet penetration, but Armor Max uses a much lighter weight material that can even be used on bullet proof helicopters.
This video totally caught me by surprise. The two mens use of teamwork is on a whole elevated level.
They look like stoner/skater dudes just stealing some snacks, so I feel chaotic neutral is the alignment here. Though, the argument could be made that while they’re Lawful Evil, those laws are toward themselves. They don’t respect the law of the land but their own laws – hence why they don’t mind grabbing some free snacks (and do so without truly holding up the shop, just nabbing a few snacks with a clever distraction) – and also act to rescue the shop owner when a true antagonist comes along. In the end, I have to agree with Chaotic Neutral though. They’re looking out for themselves, not necessarily interested in following laws if it means they can get some small nice stuff, but definitely still having a moral compass.
If you haven’t had a chance to check out his youtube page. I would highly recommend it. He bring a lot of balanced incite into the world of martial arts.
Lack of Failure in Traditional Martial Arts How many people actually allow themselves to constantly fail in order to become better? And how can avoiding failure affect our martial arts training?
Hi, my name is Rokas and in this Martial Arts Journey video we will take a look at the Lack of Failure in Traditional Martial Arts and how it affects our development.
Before we begin though, I would like to define what I mean by saying Traditional Martial Arts, as there are a number of possible interpretations to it and discussing a subject while having different interpretations of the same term may lead to a lot of misunderstanding. I do not mean to say that I think other definitions to be wrong, but the one that I am about to share with you proved to be the most efficient to me personally when debating traditional martial arts and trying to understand the whole subject.
To me, traditional martial arts are martial arts which are heavily focused on tradition, rather than practicality as its primary goal. While not always – this focus on tradition is often related to various cultural aspects. To give some examples I’ll ask some questions. Why do most Japanese martial arts schools teach to sit on the knees? Is it because it’s the healthiest way to sit? Or is it because it’s part of the Japanese culture? Why do Bujinkan (often referred to as Ninjutsu) practitioners usually wear black Gis? Is it because black is more practical for being less visible while training? Or is it rather because it alludes to ninjutsu practitioners on certain occasions in the past prefering to wear black to disguise themselves? How about defending from a Japanese sword? Is it very likely to be attacked by one these days? Or is it trained because it was more likely to happen in Japanese culture 400 years ago?
There is a story of Jigoro Kano, founder of Judo, telling that he started decreasing the amount spent in newaza, grappling on the ground, because in his opinion, to quote him: “Humans were meant to walk, not crawl”, which is actually a representation of the Japanese cultural mentality. This mentality was passed on from generation to generation even till today, as newaza in Judo is more of a side, than primary focus. Yet the question is, is it so because it’s – quote on quote – not practical or less important, or is it because it’s part of the tradition? On the other hand the Gracie family started off training Judo, which back then was still more commonly known as Jiujitsu, yet Brazilians are infamous for not caring much for tradition and authority. They did not concern themselves with such beliefs as not “crawling on the ground” and while they kept a few, minor traditions, such as wearing the Gi (which has practical aspects too), they focused mostly on practicality and efficiency, which made Brazilian Jiu Jitsu one of the most widely recognized effective martial arts today. Many more examples could be given, but as you may see, traditional martial arts tend to have a high emphasis on preserving tradition and sometimes even sacrificing practically and efficiency to do so, often times doing so unknowingly.
To summarize, one definition of traditional martial arts may be closely related to the heavy investment of a particular martial art into traditions, such as Aikido, Bujinkan, Wing Chun, various styles of Kung Fu, Tae Kwon Do and more versus other practices which are more focused on practicality such as Brazilian Jiu Jitsu, Wrestling, Muay Thai, Boxing and Kick Boxing. This is not to say that practices focused on efficiency do not have traditions or “limitations”, for example boxing focusing on striking only and neglecting wrestling or kicking. Yet it’s investment into traditions is much less significant than that of traditional martial arts. It is also interesting to point out, that the age of the martial art is not of greatest significance here. As for example Aikido, commonly referred to as a traditional martial art, being actually fairly young – officially established in 1942, compared to Brazilian Jiu Jitsu which is not referred to as a traditional martial art – having been developed around a similar time.
Now with all of that in mind, having a single definition of traditional martial arts for this discussion, we may start looking at how lack of failure may affect a traditional martial arts practitioner.
I Gave a Bounty Hunter $300. Then He Located Our Phone
T-Mobile, Sprint, and AT&T are selling access to their customers’ location data, and that data is ending up in the hands of bounty hunters and others not authorized to possess it, letting them track most phones in the country.
Nervously, I gave a bounty hunter a phone number. He had offered to geolocate a phone for me, using a shady, overlooked service intended not for the cops, but for private individuals and businesses. Armed with just the number and a few hundred dollars, he said he could find the current location of most phones in the United States.
The bounty hunter sent the number to his own contact, who would track the phone. The contact responded with a screenshot of Google Maps, containing a blue circle indicating the phone’s current location, approximate to a few hundred metres.
Queens, New York. More specifically, the screenshot showed a location in a particular neighborhood—just a couple of blocks from where the target was. The hunter had found the phone (the target gave their consent to Motherboard to be tracked via their T-Mobile phone.)
The bounty hunter did this all without deploying a hacking tool or having any previous knowledge of the phone’s whereabouts. Instead, the tracking tool relies on real-time location data sold to bounty hunters that ultimately originated from the telcos themselves, including T-Mobile, AT&T, and Sprint, a Motherboard investigation has found. These surveillance capabilities are sometimes sold through word-of-mouth networks.
Whereas it’s common knowledge that law enforcement agencies can track phones with a warrant to service providers, IMSI catchers, or until recently via other companies that sell location data such as one called Securus, at least one company, called Microbilt, is selling phone geolocation services with little oversight to a spread of different private industries, ranging from car salesmen and property managers to bail bondsmen and bounty hunters, according to sources familiar with the company’s products and company documents obtained by Motherboard. Compounding that already highly questionable business practice, this spying capability is also being resold to others on the black market who are not licensed by the company to use it, including me, seemingly without Microbilt’s knowledge.
Motherboard’s investigation shows just how exposed mobile networks and the data they generate are, leaving them open to surveillance by ordinary citizens, stalkers, and criminals, and comes as media and policy makers are paying more attention than ever to how location and other sensitive data is collected and sold. The investigation also shows that a wide variety of companies can access cell phone location data, and that the information trickles down from cell phone providers to a wide array of smaller players, who don’t necessarily have the correct safeguards in place to protect that data.
“People are reselling to the wrong people,” the bail industry source who flagged the company to Motherboard said. Motherboard granted the source and others in this story anonymity to talk more candidly about a controversial surveillance capability.
Got a tip? You can contact Joseph Cox securely on Signal on +44 20 8133 5190, OTR chat on firstname.lastname@example.org, or email email@example.com.
Your mobile phone is constantly communicating with nearby cell phone towers, so your telecom provider knows where to route calls and texts. From this, telecom companies also work out the phone’s approximate location based on its proximity to those towers.
There’s a complex supply chain that shares some of American cell phone users’ most sensitive data, with the telcos potentially being unaware of how the data is being used by the eventual end user, or even whose hands it lands in. Financial companies use phone location data to detect fraud; roadside assistance firms use it to locate stuck customers. But AT&T, for example, told Motherboard the use of its customers’ data by bounty hunters goes explicitly against the company’s policies, raising questions about how AT&T allowed the sale for this purpose in the first place.
In the case of the phone we tracked, six different entities had potential access to the phone’s data. T-Mobile shares location data with an aggregator called Zumigo, which shares information with Microbilt. Microbilt shared that data with a customer using its mobile phone tracking product. The bounty hunter then shared this information with a bail industry source, who shared it with Motherboard.
The CTIA, a telecom industry trade group of which AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile are members, has official guidelines for the use of so-called “location-based services” that “rely on two fundamental principles: user notice and consent,” the group wrote in those guidelines. Telecom companies and data aggregators that Motherboard spoke to said that they require their clients to get consent from the people they want to track, but it’s clear that this is not always happening.
A flowchart showing how the phone location data trickled down from T-Mobile to Motherboard. Image: Motherboard.
A second source who has tracked the geolocation industry told Motherboard, while talking about the industry generally, “If there is money to be made they will keep selling the data.”
“Those third-level companies sell their services. That is where you see the issues with going to shady folks [and] for shady reasons,” the source added.
Frederike Kaltheuner, data exploitation programme lead at campaign group Privacy International, told Motherboard in a phone call that “it’s part of a bigger problem; the US has a completely unregulated data ecosystem.”
Microbilt buys access to location data from an aggregator called Zumigo and then sells it to a dizzying number of sectors, including landlords to scope out potential renters; motor vehicle salesmen, and others who are conducting credit checks. Armed with just a phone number, Microbilt’s “Mobile Device Verify” product can return a target’s full name and address, geolocate a phone in an individual instance, or operate as a continuous tracking service.
Posing as a potential customer, Motherboard explicitly asked a Microbilt customer support staffer whether the company offered phone geolocation for bail bondsmen. Shortly after, another staffer emailed with a price list—locating a phone can cost as little as $4.95 each if searching for a low number of devices. That price gets even cheaper as the customer buys the capability to track more phones. Getting real-time updates on a phone’s location can cost around $12.95.
“Dirt cheap when you think about the data you can get,” the source familiar with the industry added.
A section of the price list Motherboard obtained. Image: Motherboard.
It’s bad enough that access to highly sensitive phone geolocation data is already being sold to a wide range of industries and businesses. But there is also an underground market that Motherboard used to geolocate a phone—one where Microbilt customers resell their access at a profit, and with minimal oversight.
“Blade Runner, the iconic sci-fi movie, is set in 2019. And here we are: there’s an unregulated black market where bounty-hunters can buy information about where we are, in real time, over time, and come after us. You don’t need to be a replicant to be scared of the consequences,” Thomas Rid, professor of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins University, told Motherboard in an online chat.
The bail industry source said his middleman used Microbilt to find the phone. This middleman charged $300, a sizeable markup on the usual Microbilt price. The Google Maps screenshot provided to Motherboard of the target phone’s location also included its approximate longitude and latitude coordinates, and a range of how accurate the phone geolocation is: 0.3 miles, or just under 500 metres. It may not necessarily be enough to geolocate someone to a specific building in a populated area, but it can certainly pinpoint a particular borough, city, or neighborhood.
In other cases of phone geolocation it is typically done with the consent of the target, perhaps by sending a text message the user has to deliberately reply to, signalling they accept their location being tracked. This may be done in the earlier roadside assistance example or when a company monitors its fleet of trucks. But when Motherboard tested the geolocation service, the target phone received no warning it was being tracked.
The bail source who originally alerted Microbilt to Motherboard said that bounty hunters have used phone geolocation services for non-work purposes, such as tracking their girlfriends. Motherboard was unable to identify a specific instance of this happening, but domestic stalkers have repeatedly used technology, such as mobile phone malware, to track spouses.
As Motherboard was reporting this story, Microbilt removed documents related to its mobile phone location product from its website.
A Microbilt spokesperson told Motherboard in a statement that the company requires anyone using its mobile device verification services for fraud prevention must first obtain consent of the consumer. Microbilt also confirmed it found an instance of abuse on its platform—our phone ping.
“The request came through a licensed state agency that writes in approximately $100 million in bonds per year and passed all up front credentialing under the pretense that location was being verified to mitigate financial exposure related to a bond loan being considered for the submitted consumer,” Microbilt said in an emailed statement. In this case, “licensed state agency” is referring to a private bail bond company, Motherboard confirmed.
Zumigo confirmed it was the company that provided the phone location to Microbilt and defended its practices. In a statement, Zumigo did not seem to take issue with the practice of providing data that ultimately ended up with licensed bounty hunters, but wrote, “illegal access to data is an unfortunate occurrence across virtually every industry that deals in consumer or employee data, and it is impossible to detect a fraudster, or rogue customer, who requests location data of his or her own mobile devices when the required consent is provided. However, Zumigo takes steps to protect privacy by providing a measure of distance (approx. 0.5-1.0 mile) from an actual address.” Zumigo told Motherboard it has cut Microbilt’s data access.
“People are reselling to the wrong people.”
In Motherboard’s case, the successfully geolocated phone was on T-Mobile.
“We take the privacy and security of our customers’ information very seriously and will not tolerate any misuse of our customers’ data,” A T-Mobile spokesperson told Motherboard in an emailed statement. “While T-Mobile does not have a direct relationship with Microbilt, our vendor Zumigo was working with them and has confirmed with us that they have already shut down all transmission of T-Mobile data. T-Mobile has also blocked access to device location data for any request submitted by Zumigo on behalf of Microbilt as an additional precaution.”
Microbilt’s product documentation suggests the phone location service works on all mobile networks, however the middleman was unable or unwilling to conduct a search for a Verizon device. Verizon did not respond to a request for comment.
AT&T told Motherboard it has cut access to Microbilt as the company investigates.
“We only permit the sharing of location when a customer gives permission for cases like fraud prevention or emergency roadside assistance, or when required by law,” the AT&T spokesperson said.
These statements sound very familiar. When The New York Times and Senator Ron Wyden published details of Securus last year, the firm that was offering geolocation to low level law enforcement without a warrant, the telcos said they were taking extra measures to make sure their customers’ data would not be abused again. Verizon announced it was going to limit data access to companies not using it for legitimate purposes. T-Mobile, Sprint, and AT&T followed suit shortly after with similar promises.
After Wyden’s pressure, T-Mobile’s CEO John Legere tweeted in June last year “I’ve personally evaluated this issue & have pledged that @tmobile will not sell customer location data to shady middlemen.”
“It appears these promises were little more than worthless spam in their customers’ inboxes.”
Months after the telcos said they were going to combat this problem, in the face of an arguably even worse case of abuse and data trading, they are saying much the same thing. Last year, Motherboard reported on a company that previously offered phone geolocation to bounty hunters; here Microbilt is operating even after a wave of outrage from policy makers. In its statement to Motherboard on Monday, T-Mobile said it has nearly finished the process of terminating its agreements with location aggregators.
“It would be bad if this was the first time we learned about it. It’s not. Every major wireless carrier pledged to end this kind of data sharing after I exposed this practice last year. Now it appears these promises were little more than worthless spam in their customers’ inboxes,” Wyden told Motherboard in a statement. Wyden is proposing legislation to safeguard personal data.
“Wireless carriers’ continued sale of location data is a nightmare for national security and the personal safety of anyone with a phone,” Wyden added. “When stalkers, spies, and predators know when a woman is alone, or when a home is empty, or where a White House official stops after work, the possibilities for abuse are endless.”
Recently, I had an opportunity to attend the introduction event for the new Springfield Armory Saint in Las Vegas, and the company went to great lengths to set up a lot of interesting training and shooting opportunities for us with its new 5.56 AR. One of the exercises at the event was an abbreviated hands-on training seminar with Rob Pincus of I.C.E. Training.
Rob Pincus’ reality-based training programs put students in simulations that test their decision-making skills under duress.
Founded by Pincus, I.C.E. (which stands for “integrity, consistency and efficiency”) Training offers self-defense coaching focused on reality-based training. In particular, we were given a course on armed home defense tactics, while using Saint rifles set up with Force on Force training munitions.
Prior to going live inside the customizable shoothouse, Pincus instructed the group on the basics of his particular brand of training. He explained that while traditional range training can be very effective, it can also instill habits that are more geared toward winning a match than surviving a gunfight. He said that the stresses induced by force-on-force training can be better suited (and also effectively complement range training) at giving you the skills you need to survive a life-and-death encounter.
He broke down the basics of his training into the following five-step guide:
Pincus went to great pains to drive home the point that these steps are merely guidelines, and that the fluid nature of a conflict may force you to jump ahead to one that is needed in your situation. He also pointed out that his training drives home the point that the real question is not “can” you shoot, but rather “should” you shoot.
To support this, he gave the group several hypothetical cases where we were asked what we would do. It became clear that Pincus’ approach was to ensure that you do everything reasonably possible to avoid a conflict if possible and survive, and engage a threat directly when other avenues had been exhausted. But, he also gave examples of when responding quickly would be a feasible approach (and said that your situation could easily dictate that response). The key was that he wanted to make sure that you applied a plan to what you were doing, and followed it in the most logical way.
Pincus ran the students through a simulation where they used a Springfield Saint with Force-on-Force training munitions loaded.
To drive this home, and also the effects that stress can have on your decision making, Pincus ran all the attendees through the shoothouse in a situation where we had a threat banging on the door and we had to decide how to respond. On my first run, I did not follow my plan: I evaded by moving to the bedroom where my rifle was, but I left the door open (not barricaded), and then I switched off the safety of the rifle before I had a direct line of sight on the threat. I did communicate (“called” the police) and was ready to respond, but did not do all the steps I should have in that particular situation.
In the after-action review, Pincus asked me what I did and what I thought I should have done differently. I told him that I knew what I should have done (i.e., barricade the door, keep on “safe” until I saw a direct threat per his teaching, etc.), I just did not do these things when faced with the stress of the situation. And this was the “stress” of something I knew was fake. What if it had been real? He explained that was the point of his training: Learn it here in the shoothouse instead of in my home facing an actual threat. My next time through a second course, I followed step-by-step what I should have done. Needless to say, I can see the benefits of Pincus’ approach to training. It was an eye-opening experience for me.